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Abstract
The paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. Tech-
nology is carried across borders by multinational producers and the set of technologies being
used in a particular country is endogenous. Production locations are chosen based on the costs
of production and getting the product to market. The model incorporates vertical, horizontal,
o¤shoring, and export-platform FDI. Estimated model parameters describe the states of tech-
nology in di¤erent countries, barriers to international investment, and trade costs. The model
is used to quantify the welfare e¤ects of international production and trade and to investigate
the e¤ects of free-trade agreements on o¤shoring.
JEL codes: F11, F15, F17, F21, F23, O33
Keywords: international trade, international production, technology di¤usion, foreign direct
investment, barriers to trade, barriers to investment, heterogeneous producers
1 Introduction
International production is an important feature of the modern economy. It occurs when rms
set up production in one or more locations outside of their home countries. This international
movement of producers coexists with the international movement of goods and services, with both
having the potential to greatly improve world productivity and welfare.
One of the important benets of international production is the di¤usion of technology. A rm
establishing production in a foreign country brings along its production technology, thus benetting
the host country. While this benet is important to all countries, it is especially important to the
developing countries that lack productive domestic technologies.
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. In the
model, producers may choose to locate production in their home countries or anywhere in the world
and they may sell their output anywhere in the world. An important component of the model is
the technology transfer associated with multinational production.
When deciding where to produce, producers shop for a location that gives them the lowest cost
of production and getting their product to market. As the result of this choice, a producer may
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end up making its product in its home country, target market country, or a third country. The
same producer may choose di¤erent production locations to serve di¤erent markets.1
The model incorporates productivity di¤erences across producers. Productivity achieved in
production is determined by the technology being used and the ability of a rm to implement this
technology. Technology is developed in the home country while the ability of the rm to implement
it depends on the location of production.
Technological di¤erences are probabilistic and described by a statistical distribution, as in Eaton
and Kortum (2002). However, while their model has producers drawing productivity in the country
where they are located, the model of this paper allows producers to draw productivity in their home
country and then bring this technology to the country where they produce. Therefore, this paper
extends the methodology of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to include foreign direct investment and the
associated technology transfer. This extension endogenizes technology used in production.
The model yields expressions relating bilateral international trade and production to technology,
factor costs, implementation factors, and trade costs. The model is parametrized using the average
of the 1997-2003 data on bilateral trade and international production in manufactures for the
following countries: Canada, Europe, Japan, United States, and the rest of the world (ROW).
The estimated parameters include bilateral trade costs, measures of the states of technology and
impediments to its implementation. The paper also measures the contribution of international
production to technology di¤usion.
The model is used to perform several counterfactual simulations that address questions inter-
esting to economists and policy-makers. The rst set of simulations quanties the welfare e¤ects
of the current levels of the international production and trade in manufactures. It is found that all
countries benet from trade and international production. The magnitude of the gains from trade
are similar to those found in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and is greater than the magnitude of the
gains from international production.
The second set of simulations quanties the welfare e¤ects of moving to a world in which
international trade is free and producers can establish foreign operations just as easily as they
can establish the domestic ones, a scenario called free international production in this paper. The
welfare e¤ects of such a move are found to be much greater than the welfare e¤ects of the current
levels of international production and trade. For countries that currently have productive domestic
technologies, moving to free trade or free international production brings similar welfare gains. The
ROW, however, which is dominated by developing countries, benets much more from international
production than trade.
The last simulation looks at the e¤ect of a free-trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW on
o¤shoring by the U.S. producers. The politically sensitive topic of o¤shoring often comes up in dis-
cussions of free trade agreements with developing countries. While o¤shoring currently constitutes
a relatively small fraction of the total output of the U.S. rms, there is a fear that it may grow
signicantly as the result of freetrade agreements with developing countries, which have much
lower wages.
The model is able to provide a quantitative forecast of a maximum possible change in o¤shoring
1The international investment literature distinguishes between the horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI),
when rms establish production in foreign countries in order to circumvent trade costs, and vertical FDI, when rms
do it in order to take advantage of cheaper inputs. In the latter case, the output of the foreign plant may be sold
back to the home country (a scenario called o¤shoring) or to a third country (a scenario called export-platform FDI).
The model of this paper allows for all of these possibilities.
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in response to a free trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW, where the wage is about ten
times lower than in the U.S. It is found that there is a substantial increase in the o¤shoring activity
by the U.S. producers, but the absolute magnitude of o¤shoring remains small as a fraction of
the total U.S. output or spending. The signicant impediments encountered by the U.S. rms
attempting to set up production in the ROW prevent a greater increase in o¤shoring.
There are few existing models that combine international production and trade, because of
various technical challenges inherent in creating such a model. Markusen, Venables, Konan and
Zhang (1996), Yeaple (2003), Helpman (2006), Keller and Yeaple (2008) create two- or three-
country models of various modes of FDI and trade. By comparison, the model of this paper is able
to parsimoniously describe a multi-country world where producers engage in various modes of FDI
and trade. Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) create a multi-country model of multinational
production and trade that can be viewed as an alternative to the model of this paper.
There is a number of models that consider each mode of international production in isolation.
These models can be classied into two categories: those that consider producer heterogeneity in
productivity and those that do not.
There are models of vertical FDI where rms search for low factor costs. Helpman (1984, 1985)
develops such a model without producer heterogeneity. Garetto (2008), and Yeaple (2009) are two
recent papers that incorporate producer heterogeneity. There are several models of the export-
platform FDI, all without producer heterogeneity (Hanson, 2001; Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen,
2005).
There are models of horizontal FDI, where rms replicate the same activity in many locations.
The models without producer heterogeneity include Markusen (1984) and Markusen and Venables
(1998, 2000). The models with producer heterogeneity include Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004)
and Ramondo (2008).
There is also a model of FDI called the knowledge-capital (KK) model (Markusen, 1997;
Markusen, 2002). The central feature of this model is that technology developed at the head-
quarters of a rm is copied to a¢ liates in many countries. This feature also exists in the model of
this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stylized facts regarding FDI.
Section 3 explains the model. Sections 4 describes the data. Section 5 explains the parameter esti-
mation procedure and presents the parameter estimates. Section 7 performs several counterfactual
simulations using the model. Section 8 concludes.
2 Terminology and stylized facts of international production
While the stylized facts about international trade are fairly widely known, the facts about inter-
national production are not. Therefore, it may be useful to review them here in order to motivate
the model that follows.
International production (IP) is the result of foreign direct investment (FDI). FDI is an invest-
ment in another country with the ability to exert managerial control over the production process.2
For practical purposes, international agencies equate managerial control to a 10% stake in the
enterprise. The FDI is done by multinational corporations (MNCs) that have headquarters in a
home country and operations in one or more other countries. The foreign operations of MNCs are
2The description of FDI and FDI data sources in this section is necessarily brief. It is based in part on Lipsey
(2001) who provides a much more detailed review.
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called foreign a¢ liates. If they are majority-owned (stake greater than 50%) then they are called
majority-owned foreign a¢ liates (MOFAs).
Producers have several reasons to move production outside their home countries. First, it
allows them to circumvent trade costs when serving foreign markets. Producers will be more likely
to produce in a foreign country that is distant or has high import barriers. International production
(IP) that occurs in order to achieve proximity of production to market is typically called horizontal
IP. The foreign direct investment (FDI) that is required to establish international production in
this case is called horizontalFDI. This form of FDI is an alternative to trade.
Second, moving production to other countries allows producers to take advantage of cheaper
inputs. It is often cheaper labor, but can also be other inputs, such as intermediate goods. In-
ternational production that occurs when producers shop around for cheapest production costs is
typically called vertical IP and the required FDI the verticalFDI. A special case of vertical
IP occurs when a rm produces in a foreign country and sells goods back to its home country, a
phenomenon called o¤shoring. Firms can also move production to a foreign country in order to
serve a third country, a scenario called the export-platform IP.
The size of international production can be measured in several ways. It can be measured by
the cumulative investment made by the MNCs into their a¢ liates. This measure is called the stock
of FDI and is calculated from the annual FDI ows reported in national accounts. The size of IP
can also be measured by the output, sales, employment, or reported assets of the a¢ liates.
There are advantage and disadvantage to using each of these measures. FDI ows are available
for a wide range of countries and years, but are volatile and may be inaccurate because investments
are often routed through the third countries. Industry distribution of FDI may be inaccurate for
a similar reason: investments are often routed through holding companies in other industries. In
addition, the FDI stocks reported by statistical agencies do not take into account changes in asset
and currency values.
The data on a¢ liatesoutput, sales, employment, and assets is collected by industrial surveys
and reects ownership and industry more accurately than FDI ows. However, this data is available
for only a few countries and years. The collection and reporting methodologies of this data are
sometimes inconsistent across countries.
Despite all the problems with the international production data noted above, the quantity and
quality of the IP data is improving and we now have a reasonably good picture of international
production. We know that most of it occurs in developed countries: 70% of the world FDI inows is
received by industrial countries and 70% of the U.S. MOFAs (by output) are in the G7 countries.3
The level of parental control of foreign a¢ liates is high: most (85% for the U.S.) are majority-
owned. Most of the R&D is done in the home country: only 13% of the U.S. MNCs R&D is
performed by their MOFAs.
Most of the foreign a¢ liatesoutput is sold locally (66% for the U.S. MOFAs). The rest is sold
to the home country and third countries (11% and 23% for the U.S. MOFAs). However, there is
signicant heterogeneity in these numbers across host countries. For example, the percentage of
the U.S. MOFAs output sold locally varies between 22% in Bermuda and 95% in India. Figure D1
shows how this number varies across countries. The percentage of the U.S. MOFAsoutput sold to
the U.S. varies between 0.2% in Greece and 46% in Barbados. The U.S. MOFAssales to the third
countries vary between 2% of output in India and 70% in Luxemburg.4
3Data cited in this section is from UNCTAD (2004, 2005), BEA database, and Mataloni and Yorgason (2002).
4These numbers are totals for all sectors. The variation is even greater if only manufacturing is considered.
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Produce Sell Name
Home Home Domestic non-exporting rm
Home Foreign Domestic exporting rm
Foreign Home Vertical IP, O¤shoring
Foreign Foreign Horizontal IP
Foreign Third country Export platform
Table 1: Modes of operation of producers
Sales to home are the result of o¤shoring. Sales to the third countries are the result of the
export-platform IP. O¤shoring and export-platform IP are usually considered to be the types of
vertical IP. The size of the local sales, on the other hand, is often used to measure the magnitude
of the horizontal IP.
It is interesting to compare two di¤erent ways that a company can serve a foreign market:
trade and local production. To make this comparison, we look at the ratio of the U.S. merchandise
exports to the local sales of the U.S. MOFAs. The most striking feature of this data is how much
it varies across countries. Some countries, such as Bermuda (0.08), Poland (0.11), and the U.K.
(0.15), are served mostly by multinational production. Other countries, such as Israel (5.5), Costa
Rica (2.65), and Korea (2.24), are served mostly through exports. Figure D2 shows the variation
of the ratio across countries.5 The task of the model in the following section is to explain the
multitude of strategies and behaviors of producers.
3 Model of international production and trade
There are N countries. In every country there is a continuum of producers, each making a single
good indexed by a real number j 2 [0; 1]. Consumers have CES preferences over the goods. Every
product has a blueprint for making it, a result of the R&D e¤ort. Looking at the blueprint, engineers
can predict its productivity. This predicted productivity will be called the blueprint productivity
and denoted by z(j) 2 (0;1).
The R&D process is probabilistic and producers draw their blueprint productivities from a
statistical distribution. Every country has its own blueprint for making j, so the blueprint produc-
tivity of good j in country h is denoted by zh(j). This productivity is the realization of a random
variable Zh which has a country-specic distribution with cdf F zh .
6
A producer draws its blueprint productivity in its home country, but can manufacture its
product anywhere in the world using its blueprint. The same producer may establish production
facilities in many countries. Each of these a¢ liates can then sell its product in many countries
around the world. Table 1 lists various options for a producer to organize its operations.
Throughout the paper, the home country of a producer will be denoted by h, the county of
production by i, and the country of sale by n.
In order to start production in country i, a producer needs to implement its blueprint there.
For various reasons, the productivity achieved in the production of good j may be di¤erent from its
stated blueprint productivity zh(j). This di¤erence, called the implementation factor, is a¤ected
5The ratios of exports to local sales in manufacturing are slightly higher, but vary just as much across countries.
6This section will not assume specic distributional forms for the random variables, but will derive the results in
the general case. Section 3.3 will impose distributional forms and derive the expressions that will be put to data.
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by the location of production and denoted by ih(j). The productivity achieved in production is
ih(j)zh(j).
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While zh(j) is the productivity predicted by engineers from the blueprint of j, the productivity
of the actual production process may end up being higher or lower. Therefore, the implementation
factor ih(j) is allowed to vary between 0 and 1. If 0 < ih (j) < 1, the actual productivity is
lower than what is projected by the blueprint. If 1 < ih (j) <1, the actual productivity is higher
than projected.8
The implementation factor varies across goods, which means that blueprints from country h
for di¤erent goods j will be implemented in country i with di¤erent degrees of success. We can
say that while the blueprint productivity depends on the strength of the R&D department, the
implementation factor depends on the strength of the local management team of a producer.
The implementation process is probabilistic and the implementation factors are drawn from
a distribution with cdf F ih which is specic to each country pair fi; hg. A higher mean of this
distribution makes country i more attractive to producers from country h. Implementation factors
are independent across countries i and h, and across goods j.
A producer from h that manufactures good j in country i and sells it in country n pays the
production cost ci, transportation cost dni, and sees its blueprint productivity change by ih(j).
Therefore, its total cost of this enterprise is vnih(j) = cidni=ih(j). This cost can be thought
of as a cost of getting a blueprint to market. Note that vnih(j) is inversely proportional to the
implementation factor ih(j), so that a higher ih(j) leads to a lower total cost of getting a blueprint
to market. Since ih is a random variable, vnih is also a random variable with cdf F
v
nih.
The production cost ci consists of the payments for factors and intermediate goods. Assuming
that capital and labor are the only factors, and that production function is Cobb-Douglas, the
production cost is
ci = r

i w

i p
1  
i , (1)
where  is the share of capital in output,  is the share of labor, and pi is the price of the
intermediate goods bundle.
Transportation cost has the icebergform. To receive $1 of product in country n, a producer
has to send dni > 1 dollars of product from country i. Domestic trade cost is set to one: dnn  1.
Since the goods market has perfect competition, producers set prices equal to their costs. A
producer of j from h manufacturing in i and selling in n sets the price pnih(j) = vnih(j)=zh(j). This
producer is successful in n only if it is the lowest-price supplier of j there. Therefore, it chooses
a production location i in order to minimize the cost of getting its blueprint of good j to country
n. The minimum such cost will be denoted by vnh(j) = mini fvnih(j)g. The price in country n of
product j made by an h producer will then be pnh(j) = vnh(j)=zh(j).9
7This specication is equivalent to using icebergcosts for international investment, an approach that has been
previously used by the empirical literature on FDI as well as the more recent models of FDI with heterogeneous
producers.
8The unbounded supports of the distributions of z(j) and (j) mean that the model cannot replicate zero trade
or investment ows between countries. Ramondo (2008) and Chor (2009) develop models where zero trade or FDI
ows are made possible by bounding the support of the technology distributions. While allowing unbounded supports
limits the applicability of the model to large countries or country blocks, it also reduces the complexity of the model
and makes it more tractable.
9Why cannot ih be the same for all goods j, same as trade cost dni? If ih were the same for all goods j, then
for a given pair of countries fn; hg there would have been only one (for all goods j) production location i that gives
the minimum cost to market. An implication is that for a given pair of countries, there could only be trade or IP
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The timing of the model is as follows: each producer draws its blueprint productivity zh(j) in
its home country h, then draws adjustment factors ih(j) for all possible production locations i.
Knowing these values, each producer decides whether to produce and where to produce.
Since the cost to market vnih(j) is independent across manufacturing locations i, the minimum
cost to market Vnh is a random variable distributed with cdf
F vnh = Pr (Vnh 6 v) = 1  Pr (Vnh > v) = 1  Pr (Vnih > v;8i)
= 1 Qi Pr (Vnih > v) = 1 Qi (1  F vnih) . (2)
Country h presents country n with the distribution of prices pnh, which has cdf F
p
nh. Consumers
in n buy from the lowest-price supplier of j, so the price of j there is pn(j) = minh fpnh(j)g. Since
the minimum cost to market vnh(j) is independent across h, the distribution of prices in country n
is
F pn = Pr (Pn 6 p) = 1  Pr (Pn > p) = 1  Pr (Pnh > p;8h)
= 1 Qh Pr (Pnh > p) = 1 Qh  1  F pnh . (3)
The CES price index in country n is
pn = E

P 1 n
1=(1 )
=
Z 1
0
p1 dF pn(p)
1=(1 )
. (4)
It is assumed that the intermediate goods bundle consists of all goods combined in the CES fashion.
Therefore, pn is also the price of the intermediate goods bundle in (1).
The probability that a producer from h locates its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with
j is nih  Pr (Anih) = Pr (Bnh \ Cnih) = Pr (Bnh) Pr (Cnih), where event Anih is a producer from
h locates its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with j, event Bnh is a producer from h is the
lowest-price supplier of j in n, and event Cnih is country i provides the lowest cost to market n
for a producer of j from h. The last equality holds because events Bnh and Cnih are independent.
Addressing each of these two events individually, we have
Pr (Cnih) = Pr

vnih(j) 6 min
s
fvnsh(j); s 6= ig

=
R1
0
Q
s 6=i (1  F vnsh(v)) dF vnih(v). (5)
The second equality holds because vnih are independent across i. The probability of the event Bnh
is
Pr (Bnh) = Pr

pnh(j) 6 min
s
fpns(j); s 6= hg

=
R1
0
Q
s 6=h (1  F pns(p)) dF pnh(p). (6)
Thus, the probability that a producer from h would locate its manufacturing in i in order to supply
n with j is
nih =
hR1
0
Q
s 6=h (1  F pns(p)) dF pnh(p)
i

hR1
0
Q
s 6=i (1  F vnsh(v)) dF vnih(v)
i
. (7)
Since there is a continuum [0; 1] of producers, nih is also the fraction of goods that n buys from
the i-located h producers. It means that
P
h
P
i nih = 1. Note that the two integrals in equation
(7) are guaranteed to converge because F pns and F vnsh are cdfs of random variables.
(FDI), but not both. In fact, for some country pairs, there could be no trade or investment (all production would
take place in a third country). When ih is random, di¤erent producers from h may choose di¤erent ways of serving
market n.
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3.1 Trade and foreign direct investment
Since nih is the fraction of goods that n buys from the i-located h producers, then Xnih = nihXn,
where Xn is the total spending in n, is equal to the sales in n of the i-located h producers. The
total spending in n on the goods manufactured in i, i.e. the volume of imports from i to n, is
ni = niXn, (8)
where
ni =
P
s nis (9)
is the probability that a producer located in i (of any origin h) is the least-price supplier in n.10
Note that the denition of ni means that
P
s ns = 1.
11
Total sales of the a¢ liates of h located in i are
Sih =
P
n (nihXn) . (10)
Note that for given i and h, events Anih are not mutually exclusive across ns. Some a¢ liates sell
to just one country while others sell to many countries. So, the probabilities nih cannot be added
up across n, but the dollar amounts can.12
The stock of foreign direct investment is derived from the sales of foreign a¢ liates Sih. Let ih
be the fraction of capital stock in i that is owned by the producers from h. Then, the stock of
foreign direct investment in i owned by the h producers is ihKi. Let ih be the fraction of the
labor force in i employed by the producers from h. These denitions of ih and ih mean thatP
s is =
P
s is = 1.
Then, note that the distribution of the production e¢ ciencies ihzh of the producers that are
actually producing in i is the same regardless of their origin h. In other word, conditioning on the
origin h does not a¤ect the distribution of ihzh. A country h with a higher state of technology
and lower barriers to investment in i will increase the number of a¢ liates in i until the distribution
of their e¢ ciencies is the same as that of the a¢ liates from the other countries (and that of is
domestic producers).
The above means that the average (across producers) capital-output ratio (and also the labor-
output ratio) is the same for any origin h. This allows us to relate ih and ih to the sales of foreign
a¢ liates:
ih = ih =
Sih
Qi
=
1
Qi
P
n (nihXn) . (11)
Therefore, both ih and ih measure the ownership structure of a countrys producers.
10Note that for given n and i, events Anih across di¤erent hs are mutually exclusive. In other words, two producers
from any two locations h1 and h2 cannot establish manufacturing facilities in the same location i in order to supply
the same product j to the same market n. Therefore nih are additive across origins h. Also, for given n and h
events Anih across di¤erent is are mutually exclusive, since a producer from h would not establish a¢ liates in more
than one location i in order to supply the same market n. Therefore nih is additive across production locations i.
11 It is also possible to derive the volume of sales of h producers (manufacturing anywhere in the world) in n.
Let nh =
P
s nsh be the probability that a producer from h (manufacturing anywhere in the world) sells in n.
Therefore, nhXn is the volume of sales of h rms in n. The expression for nh simplies considerably. The second
term in the expression for nih disappears, and the probability that a producer from h (manufacturing anywhere) is
the least-price supplier in n is simply nh  Pr (pnh(j) 6 mins fpns(j); s 6= hg).
12So
P
n nih is not a probability that a rm located in i has come from h (or a fraction of rms located in i that
has come from h), because some a¢ liates may sell to more than one destination.
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Equation (8) is a gravity-like equation for international trade because it relates trade to country
characteristics and trade costs. Equation (11) is a gravity-like equation for FDI because it relates
FDI to country characteristics and the implementation factors, which can be interpreted as barriers
to investment.
3.2 Market clearing
Due to data limitations, only the manufacturing industries are modeled. Model closure follows the
usual practice. In each country i, output must equal spending:
Qi =
PN
n=1 niXn. (12)
Manufacturing goods can be used as either nal or intermediate goods. Therefore, Xn = Zn +Cn,
where Zn is the spending on the intermediate manufacturing goods and Cn is the spending on
the nal manufacturing goods. The latter is assumed to be a xed portion of a countrys income:
Cn = 'nYn. The former is given by the production function: Zn = (1    )Qn. Putting these
expressions together we obtain the equation for total spending:
Xn = (1    )Qn + 'nYn. (13)
Country income is the sum of capital income and labor income in manufacturing, and nonman-
ufacturing income. It is assumed that the prots are not repatriated to the headquarters. This
assumption is made for two reasons: (a) to make the technology transfer the only transfer asso-
ciated with FDI, so the focus stays on it and (b) to make the model more similar to Eaton and
Kortum (2002) where income stays in the country of production.
The total income in n is
Yn = wnLn + rnKn + Y
o
n , (14)
where Y on is the nonmanufacturing income. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), the nonmanufac-
turing income is considered xed.
Factor stocks Kn and Ln are specic to manufacturing. Capital and labor are not mobile be-
tween the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. Factor markets are perfectly competitive.
Factor employments are given by
Kn = Qn=rn and Ln = Qn=wn. (15)
3.3 Imposing distributional forms
As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), it is assumed that the productivity draws zh(j) > 0 have the
Fréchet distribution with the shaping parameter  and location parameter h. The cdf of zh is
therefore F zh (z) = e
 hz  , where  is common across countries while h is di¤erent.13 Parameter
h measures the state of the domestically-sourced technology in each country.
13The mean and variance of a Fréchet random variable are E [z] = 1= 

1  1


, for  > 1 and V ar(z) =
2=

 

1  2


   2

1  1


, for  > 2, where   is the Gamma function.
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It is assumed that implementation factors ih(j) > 0 are also distributed Fréchet.
14 The cdf
of ih is F

ih() = e
 	ih  , where the shaping parameter  is the same across country pairs while
the location parameter 	ih is di¤erent.
If ih is distributed Fréchet, then vnih = cidni=ih has the Weibull distribution with cdf F
v
nih =
1  e ~	nihv , where ~	nih = 	ih (cidni) . The probability that country i provides a producer from
h with the lowest cost to market n (event Cnih) is
Pr (Cnih) =
R1
0
Q
s 6=i (1  F vnsh(v)) dF vnih(v) =
	ih (cidni)
 PN
s=1	sh (csdns)
  =
~	nihPN
s=1
~	nsh
= ~	nih 	
 1
nh ,
(16)
where 	nh =
P
s
~	nsh. The least cost-to-market vnh is distributed with cdf F vnh = 1 
Q
i (1  F vnih) =
1  e 	nhv .
The price pnh(j) = vnh(j)=zh(j) is the product of two independent (not necessarily identically
distributed) Weibull random variables (vnh and ~zh = 1=zh, since the inverse of a Fréchet r.v. is
a Weibull r.v.). This product is itself a random variable with cdf F pnh(p) = R

p;; ; 	nh;h

and pdf fpnh(p) = r

p;; ; 	nh;h

, where functions R () and r () will be dened below. The
distribution of this random variable is derived by Sagias, Karagiannidis, Mathiopoulos and Tsiftsis
(2006), Sagias and Tombras (2007), and Bithas, Sagias, Tsiftsis and Karagiannidis (2007).15
To make the numerical analysis workable, it is assumed that the shaping parameters of the
distributions of vnih and ~zh are the same. When  =  the cdf and pdf of pnh are
F pnh(p) = R

p; ; ; 	nh;h

= 1  2

	nhh
1=2
p=2K1

2

	nhh
1=2
p=2

(17)
and
fpnh(p) = r

p; ; ; 	nh;h

= 2	nhhp
 1K0

2

	nhh
1=2
p=2

, (18)
where Kq () is the qth order modied Bessel function of the second kind.
The probability that an h producer located in i is the lowest-price supplier of j in n (event Bnh)
is
Pr (Bnh) =
R1
0
Q
s 6=h (1  F pns(p)) dF pnh(p) =
=
R1
0
Q
s 6=h

1 R

p; ; ; 	is;s

dR

p; ; ; 	nh;h

. (19)
Therefore, the probability that a producer from h would establish production in i in order to supply
n is given by the following integral equation:
nih = ~	nih 	
 1
nh
R1
0
hQ
s 6=h

1 R

p; ; ; 	is;s
i
r

p; ; ; 	nh;h

dp. (20)
14The technology being used to make good j and the implementation procedure for this technology both represent
best available practices. Therefore, it is reasonable to represent them by extreme-value distributions.
15Note that a product of two Weibull random variables cannot be approximated by a Weibull random variable
(Sagias and Tombras, 2007).
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Plugging in the expressions for the cdf and pdf of p, this equation becomes
nih = ~	nih 	
 1
nh
R1
0
Q
s 6=h 2

	iss
1=2
p=2K1

2

	iss
1=2
p=2


2~	nihhp 1K0

2

~	nihh
1=2
p=2

dp
= 2N ~	2nih
	 1nhh
Q
s 6=h

	iss
1=2 
R10 p(N+1)=2 1K02	nhh1=2 p=2Qs 6=hK12	iss1=2 p=2 dp, (21)
that can be evaluated numerically. The integral converges, as explained below equation (7).
Prices in each country are distributed with cdf
F pn(p) = 1 
Q
s 2

	nss
1=2
p=2K1

2

	nss
1=2
p=2

(22)
which has the corresponding pdf
fpn(p) =
P
i

2	niip
 1K0

2

	nii
1=2
p=2
Q
s 6=i

2

	nss
1=2
p=2K1

2

	nss
1=2
p=2

(23)
derived in the technical appendix (available upon request). The CES prices index in country n is
given by equation (4).
3.4 A¢ liate strategies
Section 2 described various strategies employed by producers in their quest to nd the most cost-
e¢ cient ways to serve various markets. These strategies, summarized in Table 1, include exporting,
o¤shoring, horizontal IP, and export-platform IP. How do various parameters of the model a¤ect
the incentives of producers to choose one strategy over another?
When deciding how to serve a particular market n, a producer considers the cost of imple-
menting its blueprint, cost of production, and cost of delivering the manufactured good to market.
A producer will be a domestic exporter if the domestic implementation factor is high, domestic
production cost is low, and the trade cost to market n is low. On the other hand, if the trade cost
to market n is high, the implementation factor in n is high (which is more likely if 	nh is high),
and the cost of production in n is low then the best strategy will be to set up a foreign a¢ liate in
n and sell output locally, i.e. engage in horizontal IP.
It may be possible, though, that the trade cost from the home country to n is high, but the
implementation factor in n is low or the cost of production there is high. In that case a producer
will look for a country close to n with a high implementation factor and low production cost in
order to establish production there and export output to n. This a¢ liate will then be engaged in
export-platform IP.
Everything else equal, low trade costs dni will encourage imports into n, while high trade costs
will encourage horizontal IP there (tari¤ jumping). High implementation factors in n (high 	nh)
and low production costs cn will encourage producers to set up manufacturing in n. Low costs of
shipping goods from n to other countries will encourage producers to use n as the platform for
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the export-oriented IP. Low costs of shipping goods from n to the producershome countries will
encourage o¤shoring.
How do producer characteristics relate to the producers mode of operation (one of those listed
in Table 1)? For example, which producers will engage in trade and IP and which will only sell on
the domestic market? Both trade and IP involve additional costs compared to domestic production
and sales. Therefore, more productive producers are more likely to be competitive in foreign
markets. So, more productive producers are more likely to engage in trade and/or IP. Also, more
productive producers will serve more markets than less productive ones.16 These properties of the
model match the observed producer facts.17
Of those producers that do serve foreign countries, which will engage in horizontal IP and which
will be exporters? For a producer from h the decision whether to export to i or establish an a¢ liate
there comes down to which option will give a lower price of its good in i. If a producer were to
export to i, the price for its good in i would be pexportihh (j) = chdih=hh(j)zh(j).
18 If this producer
were to set up an a¢ liate in i, the price for its good would be pIPiih(j) = ci=ih(j)zh(j). The ratio
of these prices is
pexportihh (j)
pIPiih(j)
=
ch=hh(j)
ci=ih(j)
dih. (24)
If this ratio is greater than one, then local production is a better option. If it is less than one,
then trade is better. The ratio depends on the cost of production in h relative to i, implementation
factor in i relative to h, and the cost of bringing a good from h to i.
Can we say something about the productivity of the producers that choose to export vs. those
that choose IP? We can if we make an assumption that exporting is cheaper than IP for most
producers and most destinations (Section 5.1 shows that this assumption holds for the countries
in this papers dataset). In this case, a producer is more likely to engage in exports than IP (and
more producers engage in exports than IP). This means that a producer serving more destinations
is more likely to serve some of them through IP than a producer serving fewer destinations.19 Since
more productive producers serve more destinations, they are more likely to engage in IP than less
productive producers. This matches the observed fact that producers that engage in IP are, on
average, more productive than those that only export.20
It is also interesting to consider the choice between domestic production and o¤shoring. If a
producer from h wanting to supply its good to its home market were to manufacture the good
domestically, its price would be pdomhhh (j) = ch=hh(j)zh(j). If instead the manufacturing took place
at an o¤shore a¢ liate in i, the price (in country h) would be poffshorehih (j) = chdhi=ih(j)zh(j). The
16Because some markets n are more expensive to serve than others, more productive producers will be competitive
in more markets than less productive producers.
17There is a large literature that looks at producer-level heterogeneity in trade. This literature nds that exporters
are a minority and more productive than non-exporters. More productive exporters sell to more destinations than
less productive exporters (Aw, Chung and Roberts, 1998; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen,
1999; Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, 2004).
18The superscript export is not necessary, but is added for convenience.
19Similarly, of the rms that serve a specic number of destinations, the fraction of pure exporters (not engaged
in IP) declines as the number of destinations rises.
20There are several studies of producer heterogeneity in international production. They nd that only a small
fraction of rms engage in FDI and that these rms are more productive than the exporting rms (Helpman et al.,
2004; Tomiura, 2007).
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ratio of these prices is
pdomhhh (j)
poffshorehih (j)
=
ch=hh(j)
ci=ih(j)
1
dhi
. (25)
If this ratio is greater than one, then o¤shoring is a better option. Otherwise, domestic production
is better. Similarly to (24), this ratio depends on cost of production in h relative to i and the imple-
mentation factor in i relative to h. However, the trade cost is now in the denominator rather than
numerator. Therefore, it will always be the case that pexportihh (j)=p
IP
iih(j) > pdomhhh (j)=p
offshore
hih (j). A
producer that prefers o¤shoring to domestic production will also prefer local production (horizontal
IP) to exporting. A producer that is actually engaged in o¤shoring (being a least-price supplier of
j in h) will also engage in local production and sales of j in i. Section 5.1 continues this analysis
in view of the estimated parameter values.
4 Data
The dataset includes 5 countries: Canada, Europe (which includes France, Germany, Italy, Nor-
way, Spain, Sweden, and UK), Japan, United States, and the rest of the world (denoted by ROW
and dominated by China). Because of the availability of data, only the manufacturing sector is
considered. The following data was collected: output, value added, total exports, total imports,
employment, labor compensation, and bilateral trade from the World Banks Trade and Production
database, total country GDP from the World Banks WDI database, and employment by foreign
a¢ liates from the OECDs Globalization database (see Section 2 for a discussion on various mea-
sures of activity of foreign a¢ liates). Data is typically the average of several (2-3) years around
2000.
Table D1 shows the country-level data. Note that the ROWs manufacturing output is similar
to that of the U.S. and Europe, but its employment is an order of magnitude higher and its wage
is an order of magnitude lower.
Table D2 shows domestic and international trade, ni. Domestic trade (domestic spending on
domestic goods, shown on the diagonal of the table) is much larger than international trade (shown
on the o¤-diagonal entries). Note that each row adds up to the total spending of the importer and
each column to the total output of the exporter.
Table D3 shows the same data, but as a fraction of the total spending of the importer (so each
row adds up to one), ni. The fraction of the domestic goods in total spending varies between
0.47 in Canada and 0.89 in Japan. Tables D4 also shows the same trade data, but as a fraction of
the total output of the exporter. It clearly shows the signicance of the U.S. market for Canadian
rms: they sell 47% of their output on the domestic market and 45% on the U.S. market. Tables
3 and 4 show that Japan is the most closed economy of the ve. The weight of its domestic trade
in its total spending or output is greater than for any other country. We can also see that Canada
is the most open economy of the ve.
Table D5 shows the employment in each of the ve countries classied by the country of own-
ership of the enterprise. This employment data shows the extent of the domestic and international
production activities of the rms. Domestic production (measured by the number of workers em-
ployed by domestic rms, shown on the diagonal of the table) is much larger than international
production (measured by the number of workers employed by foreign rms, shown on the o¤-
diagonal entries). The sum of each row is the total employment in each country. The sum of each
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column is the total employment at all the rms from that country.
Table D6 shows the same data, but as a fraction of the total employment in each country
(so that each row adds up to one). This is the ownership structure of each countrys producers,
previously dened as ih. It shows that domestic rms employ between 71% (in Canada) and 98%
(in Japan) of the labor force. There is a substantial presence of the U.S. rms in Canada: they
employ 21% of the Canadian workers. The U.S. rms employ about 6% of all workers in Europe
and European rms employ about 6% of all U.S. workers.
Very few Japanese workers are employed by foreign rms. For example, the U.S. rms employ
only 0.8% of the Japanese workers. While a good number of workers are employed by foreign rms
in the rest of the world, their number is small relative to the total workforce there. European rms
employ 3% of the ROWs workforce, while the U.S. rms employ 2%.
Table D7 also shows the employment data, but this time as a fraction of the total employment
by each countrys rms (so that each column adds up to one). The table shows that for all the
countries except the ROW, a signicant part of the economic activity of their rms takes place
outside the national borders. For example, only 77% of workers employed by the U.S. rms are
American. The table also shows that the ROWs workers constitute a signicant percentage of the
workforce of each countrys rms. For example, 14% of the workers employed by the U.S. rms are
located in the ROW.
5 Parameter estimation
We begin by identifying parameters 	ih, dni, and h. It was previously assumed that domestic
trade is free, i.e. dnn  1. It is also assumed that 	hh  1. Therefore, there are N  (N   1)
parameters dni, N  (N  1) parameters 	ih, and N parameters h that need to be identied. The
total number of these parameters is 2N2  N .
The parameters are identied by tting equations (8) and (11) to data:
ni =
P
s nis, n 6= i, (26)
ih =
P
n (nihXn)
Qi
, (27)
with nih given by (21):
nih = 2
N ~	2nih
	 1nhh
Q
s 6=h

	iss
1=2 
R10 p(N+1)=2 1K02	nhh1=2 p=2Qs 6=hK12	iss1=2 p=2 dp, (28)
and the following variables as dened earlier: ~	nih = 	ih

ri w

i p
1  
i dni
 
and 	nh =
P
s
~	nsh.
Note that the market clearing conditions Qi =
PN
n=1 niXn are implied by equations (27).
21
Equations (26) and (27) number 2N2   N . Spending Xn, output Qn, trade ni, ownership
structure ih, and wages wn are taken from data. Capital share  is set to 0.105, labor share  to
21This can be see by taking the sum of (27) over h and remembering that ni =
P
h nih, and
P
h ih = 1.
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0.195, and (gross) rates of return rn to 20% in every country.22 The value of elasticity  used to
calculate the CES price index is set to 5.23
The value of the shaping parameter  is set to 8. This is the value estimated in Eaton and
Kortum (2002) using price data. Changing the value of  a¤ects the estimated parameter values in
the manner similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002). Setting a lower  increases estimated trade costs
dni and decreases estimated parameters of the implementation factorsdistributions 	ih (so lower 
results in higher estimated trade and IP costs).24 ;25 The next section presents the estimated values
of h, 	ih, and dni for  = 8.
5.1 Results
Since there are 5 countries, there are 2N2   N = 45 parameters to be identied from the same
number of equations. Table B1 shows each countrys estimated mean blueprint productivity, nor-
malized with respect to the U.S. This mean productivity is calculated as (h=US)
1=. We can see
that Japan has a slightly higher state of technology than the U.S., while Europe and Canada have
lower states. The ROW has a much lower state of technology than the other countries.
Table B2 shows the estimated mean implementation factors, calculated as 	1=ih . The table shows
owner countries in columns and host countries in rows. For example, the mean implementation
factor for the U.S. rms operating in Canada is 0.74.
All mean international implementation factors are smaller than one, i.e. smaller than the mean
domestic implementation factors. This indicates that producers are, on average, more e¢ cient when
they manufacture goods at home than abroad. Of course, cheaper costs of production and trade
can still entice producers to move their operations abroad even when the implementation factors
are less than one.
The producers from Canada, Europe, and the U.S. operating in the ROW have very small (0.3-
0.4) mean implementation factors. Since the ROW is dominated by developing countries, especially
China, producers operating there have to deal with poor infrastructure, unfriendly governments,
etc., which make the implementation factors there very low. On the other hand, producers from
the ROW operating in the other countries have implementation factors that are quite high. While
they have to deal with all the usual issues of establishing production abroad, they often face more
favorable business conditions in the foreign countries than at home.
22The share of intermediate goods in output is then 0.7. The implied shares of capital and labor in value added
are 0.35 and 0.65. The 20% gross rate of return assumes a 10% net return and 10% depreciation rate.
23The value of parameter  has a negligible e¤ect on the parameter estimates or simulation results. For example,
choosing a  between 1.1 and 10 changes the relative price levels by less than 1%.
24Lower  results in higher variance of the technology distribution, thus increasing the probability that a country
has a producer that can be competitive in foreign markets. To t the existing trade and IP values, the model o¤sets
this e¤ect by setting higher trade and IP costs.
25The simulation results presented in this paper are robust to the value of . Consider, for example, two cases: (a)
a low  and the corresponding high estimates of dni; n 6= i and (b) a high  and the corresponding low estimates of
dni; n 6= i. Then, in each case, consider performing a counterfactual experiment that sets dni = 1; 8n; i (i.e. free
trade). Such an experiment is performed in Section 7.1.2. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), parameter  determines
the response of trade ows to changes in trade costs: higher  means smaller response. So, moving to free trade
results in approximately the same predicted changes of trade ows in both cases. In case (a), changes in trade costs
are large, but trade ows are not sensitive to changes in trade costs. In case (b), changes in trade costs are small,
but trade ows are very sensitive to changes in trade costs. Welfare changes are also approximately similar in both
cases since they are a function of the changes in trade. The same logic applies to simulating free IP and autarky.
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Besides the ROW producers, high implementation factors are enjoyed by the U.S. rms operat-
ing in Canada, and by European and Canadian rms operating in the U.S. The high implementation
factors between the U.S. and Canada are not surprising since NAFTA contains many provisions
designed to facilitate FDI. Comparing host countries, we can see that the highest implementation
factors are in the United States, which means that it provides a good environment for foreign
producers.
Producers trying to establish production in Japan and Japanese producers trying to establish
production abroad face low implementation factors. Much has been written about the di¢ culties
encountered by the non-Japanese rms trying to operate in Japan, so their low implementation
factors are not surprising. The low implementation factors of the Japanese producers operating
abroad are less expected. Perhaps they can be explained by management style di¤erences or some
other business culture-related factors.
Looking at the technology parameters and implementation factors, we can ask the following
question: can the average producer from a country drawing the average implementation factor in
a foreign country be competitive with the average producer of the host country? Both producers
face the same production and transportation costs. The only di¤erence is the productivity with
which they operate.
For each country pair, Table B3 shows the production productivity of the average producer from
country h (shown in columns) operating in country i (shown in rows), drawing the corresponding
average implementation factor. This production productivity is equal to (	ihh=US)
1=. For ex-
ample the average producer from Europe operating in Canada would draw the blueprint productiv-
ity of 0:95 and the implementation factor of 0:62 resulting in the productivity of 0:950:62  0:58.
The diagonal entries show the productivities of the average domestic producers (since the average
domestic implementation factors are one).
Table B3 shows that the production productivities are such that in every country the aver-
age domestic producer has an advantage over the average foreign producers drawing the average
implementation factors. This implies that to be successful in a foreign country, a producer must
either have a blueprint productivity that is better than his home countrys average or draw an
implementation factor that is better than average. The former can be achieved by having a better
than average R&D department and the latter by having better than average managers.
Table B4 shows the estimated trade costs. The average trade cost across all 20 country pairs is
1.65 (the tari¤ equivalent of this cost is 65%). This is similar to a typical international trade cost
roughly estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) to be 0.74%. The lowest trade costs are
between the U.S. and Canada (17% and 35% tari¤ equivalents) and between Europe and the ROW
(24% and 33%). The highest trade costs are faced by the Japanese producers selling to Europe and
Canada (114% and 122%).
The rest of the model parameters: country labor and capital endowments Li and Ki, share of
manufacturing in country spending 'i, and nonmanufacturing income Y
o
i , are easy to calculate.
Because of the assumption of equal labor shares across countries, the labor stocks Ln are calculated
as Ln = Qn=wn instead of being taken from data. These calculated labor stocks, shown in Table
B5 are very similar to the ones in the data with the correlation being 0.998. The capital stocks are
calculated as Kn = Qn=rn.
Preference parameters 'n are calculated as 'n = Cn=Yn, where Cn is the spending on nal
goods and Yn is the GDP. Spending on nal goods is calculated as total spending minus spending
on intermediate goods: Cn = Xn   (1    )Qn, while GDP is taken from data. The nonman-
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ufacturing income is calculated as Y on = Yn   wnLn   rnKn. Table B5 presents the values of the
preference parameters 'n. It shows that manufacturing makes up about 10 to 15% of each countrys
spending.
5.1.1 Relationships between trade costs, implementation factors, and technology pa-
rameters
What are the relationships between the values of these key parameters? The trade costs dni and
mean implementation factors 	1=ni are negatively correlated ( =  0:58).26 They are plotted
together on Figure B1. Since low implementation factors are a barrier to international production
while high trade costs are a barrier to international trade, this result means that these two kinds
of international barriers go hand-in-hand. The relatively high correlation between the two means
that one can serve as a fairly accurate predictor of the other.27
A possible explanation for the high correlation between trade and investment barriers is that
some of the factors that a¤ect one also a¤ect the other. For example, common language, physical
proximity, free-trade agreements, and institutions are known to a¤ect trade costs and likely also
a¤ect implementation factors. Government policy toward imports may be a subset of a more general
policy toward openness that a¤ects not only trade, but also foreign investment.
There is little or no correlation between the implementation factors and technology parameters
of the owner and host countries. This means that high-technology countries do not o¤er better
implementation factors as hosts or face lower implementation factors as investors than the low-
technology countries.
5.1.2 A¢ liate strategies revisited
Section 3.4 discussed the choice of producers between exporting to a destination vs. setting up
production there. It was said that if exporting is cheaper than setting up production for most
producers and most destination, then more producers will engage in exports than IP and those
producers that engage in IP will, on average, be more productive than exporters. We can now
check if exporting is indeed cheaper than IP for most producers and most destinations in the
dataset.
We will calculate the price that a producer from h expects to receive if it exports its goods to
i relative to the price that it expects to receive if it sets up production in i:
E
"
pexportihh
pIPiih
#
=
ch=E [hh]
ci=E [ih]
dih =
ch
ci
	
1=
ih dih. (29)
This ratio depends on the relative cost of production in h and i, average implementation factor
faced by an h producer in i, and the cost of bringing goods from h to i. The relative costs of
production for each pair of countries are shown in Table B6, where i is a row and h is a column.
It shows that for Canada, Europe, Japan, and the U.S. the relative costs of production are within
15% of each other. On the other hand, the costs of production in those countries are, on average,
26The correlation coe¢ cient excludes the diagonal entries.
27The slope of the relationship between trade costs and implementation factors on Figure B1 is close to  1. The
relationship between trade costs and implementation factors tightens signicantly if the country pairs involving ROW
are excluded ( becomes  0:77).
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50% greater than in ROW. Average implementation factors were shown in Table B2 and trade costs
in Table B4. We can see in Table B2 that the low cost of production in the ROW is o¤set by the
low implementation factors there.28
Table B7 shows the ratio of the expected prices E
h
pexportihh =p
IP
iih
i
. Out of the 20 country pairs
only 3 have this ratio greater than one. For those pairs of countries, IP gives a lower expected price
than exporting. For example, the U.S. producers targeting the European market and the European
producers targeting the U.S. market will, on average, nd that setting up production in the target
market gives them a lower price than exporting. The same is true for the Canadian producers
targeting the European market. For the vast majority (17 out of 20) of country pairs, exporting to
a destination will, on average, give a lower price than setting up production in the target market.
Therefore, the assumption made in Section 3.4 that exporting is cheaper than setting up local
production for most producers and most destination holds for the countries in the dataset.
Section 3.4 also discussed the choice between domestic production and o¤shoring. We can now
calculate the price that a producer from h expects to receive if it produces a good domestically
relative to the price that it expects to receive if it produces the good o¤shore:
E
"
pdomhhh
poffshorehih
#
=
ch=E [hh]
ci=E [ih]
1
dhi
=
ch
ci
	
1=
ih
1
dhi
. (30)
Table B8 shows this ratio for all country pairs. All the relative expected prices are signicantly
less than one, meaning that domestic production is on average much cheaper than o¤shoring for all
countries. The best chance that o¤shoring may produce a lower price exists between the U.S. and
Canada where NAFTA helps to make implementation factors high and trade costs low. Since the
relative expected prices are less then one, producers will only engage in o¤shoring if their foreign
implementation factor draw relative to their home implementation factor draw, ih(j)=hh(j), is
better (greater) than average.
5.1.3 Model vs. data
Section 2 presented the stylized facts on international production. One of the facts mentioned in
that section is that the percentage of output of the U.S. foreign a¢ liates that is sold locally varies
from country to country. This percentage for various countries around the world is shown on Figure
D1.
We can now examine what the model has to say about the size of local sales. Remember that
when parametrizing the model, we only used the data on the total employment of a¢ liates located
in each country. We did not use the data on how much of the a¢ liatesoutput is sold locally. The
28While the labor compensation in Canada, Europe, Japan, and the U.S. is 7 to 10 times greater than in the ROW,
it constitutes only 20% of the cost of production. Since the prices of capital and intermediate goods are fairly similar
in all countries, the di¤erences in the costs of production are not as great; There is certainly anecdotal evidence that
operating in the U.S. is not much more expensive than operating in China (which dominates the ROW data). For
example, an article in the L.A. Times (Lee (2008)) tells a story of a Chinese businessman opening a printing-plate
factory in South Carolina. He explains that land costs less than 1/4 of what it does in southeast China, electricity
rates are about 75% lower, and there are no blackouts. While the South Carolina labor costs are higher ($12-13/hr
vs. $2/hr), they are partially o¤set by payroll tax credits from the state government (the di¤erences in land costs,
electricity costs, and tax incentives are captured in the model by the di¤erences in the expected implementation
factors). The bottom line? I was surprised,said the businessman. The gap is not as large as I thought.
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model, however, can infer the percentage of output sold locally. It is equal to iihXi=
P
n nihXn,
where n; i 6= h.
Figure B2 shows the local sales of the U.S. a¢ liates predicted by the model as percentages
their total sales (output) in each country. Similarly to Figure D1, this gure shows a good deal of
variation across countries.
It would be interesting to compare these model predictions to data. Of all the countries in
the dataset, there is only data on the size of the local sales for the U.S. a¢ liates in Canada and
Japan.29 The percentage of the U.S. a¢ liatess output sold locally in Canada is predicted by the
model to be 61%, while the data shows it to be 55%. In Japan, the model predicts the fraction of
output sold locally to be 96%, while it is 90% in the data. The numbers are close, but the model
overpredicts the size of the local sales somewhat.30
6 Comparison with the Eaton-Kortum model
It is educational to compare the technology parameters h estimated above with the technology
parameters of the Eaton-Kortum model. The Eaton-Kortum model assumes that there is no FDI
or technology di¤usion so that all producers in country i draw productivity from that countrys
technology distribution. Specically, the producer of good j in country i draws its production
productivity zi(j) from the productivity distribution of country i that has the Fréchet form with
the location parameter Ti and shaping parameter  (common to all countries).
As in the model of this paper, the producer of good j in country i can bring its good to country
n at a cost dni. Of course, among all the producers of good j (in various countries), only the
producer that o¤ers the cheapest price succeeds in selling its good in country n. Given this setup,
Eaton and Kortum derive the expression for bilateral trade:
ni =
Ti (cidni)
 P
s Ts (csdni)
  , (31)
where ni, ci, and dni have the same meanings as in this paper. Eaton and Kortum assume that
labor is the only factor of production, but for compatibility purposes I will modify their model and
assume that capital and labor are the factors of production, so that ci is given by (1):
ci = r

i w

i p
1  
i , (32)
Eaton and Kortum derive the price index for their model:
pi = 
hP
s Ts (csdni)
 
i 1=
, (33)
where  is a constant. The market clearing conditions in Eaton and Kortum and the model of this
paper are the same, given by equations (12)-(15).
I can infer the parameter values of the Eaton-Kortum model from the same data used in the
previous section to infer the parameters of the model of this paper. Of course, the data on the
29We cannot simply add up the local sales in the European or ROW countries to obtain the local sales of the U.S.
a¢ liates in Europe and the ROW. Consider, for example, the sales of the U.S. a¢ liates located in France to Italy.
These sales are local sales for Europe, but will be classied as sales to third countries in the BEAs data.
30Changing the value of parameter  has a negligible e¤ect on the percentages inferred by the model.
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activity of foreign a¢ liates will not be needed since the Eaton-Kortum model does not have FDI.
Also, since I want to focus on the estimates of the technology parameters, I will use the trade costs
dni estimated in the previous section instead of using the Eaton-Kortum methodology of estimating
them.31 To infer the Eaton-Kortums technology parameters, I will use the market clearing equation
(12):
Qi =
PN
n=1 niXn (34)
with ni given by (31), ci by (32), and pi by (33). Equations (34) constitute a system of N equations
of N unknown Tis. They are solved using data on output, spending, wages, and rates of return
described in Section 4, and trade costs estimated in the previous section.
How would we expect T and  to be di¤erent? If there is no international production then T
and  should be the same. For small volumes of international production, their values should be
similar. On the other hand, if a country has a low , but many producers from high- countries
operating on its territory, we would expect its T to be noticeably higher than its . As the volume
of international production increases, we would expect Ts to become more and more similar across
countries, while s would of course remain the same. In an extreme case, when international
production is as easy as the domestic production (i.e. 	 = 1 for all pairs of countries), we would
expect Ts to be the same in all countries.
Table B9 presents each countrys mean productivity inferred from the Eaton-Kortum model and
normalized with respect to the United States. This mean productivity is calculated as (Ti=TUS)
1=.
The values of these mean productivities are very similar to the values of (i=US)
1= shown
in Table B1 with the exception of Canada, where TCAN is higher than CAN . This result makes
perfect sense in light of the discussion above.32 As mentioned before, the present-day volumes of
international production are fairly low for most countries. So for most countries the value of the
parameter T is similar to the value of the parameter . This is even the case for the ROW where
own technology is low so the potential benet from international production is high.
One notable exception in the dataset is Canada where, as shown on Table D6, 29% of the labor
force is employed by foreign producers, mostly from the U.S. Therefore, TCAN is noticeably higher
than CAN . This di¤erence implies a substantial technology transfer to Canada that we would
expect to bring sizable welfare gains. Welfare gains from international production are analyzed in
the Section 7.1.
As mentioned earlier, if international production is as easy as the domestic one, we would expect
Ts to be the same in all countries. So, an interesting experiment would be to use the model of
this paper to simulate a world in which international production is as easy as the domestic one and
then use the Eaton-Kortum model to infer the T parameters in such a world. This experiment is
done in Section 7.1.2.
7 Counterfactual simulations
Having a fully parametrized model allows us to perform counterfactual simulations. To simulate
a scenario means to solve for the endogenous variables ni, ih, Qn, Xn, wn, rn, and pn given the
31They use a gravity-like equation to estimate the trade costs.
32This result also serves as a check of the model of this paper.
20
model parameters Kn, Ln, Y on , n, 	ih, , dni, , , , and 'n. The endogenous variables are
found using equations (8), (11)-(15), and (4) reproduced below for convenience:
ni =
P
h nih, n 6= i, (35)
ih =
P
n (nihXn)
Qi
, i 6= h, (36)
Qi =
XN
n=1
niXn, (37)
Xn = (1    )Qn + 'n (wnLn + rnKn + Y on ) , (38)
ri = Qi=Ki, wi = Qi=Li, and (39)
pn =
Z 1
0
p1 dF pn(p)
1=(1 )
, (40)
where nih is given by (21):
nih = 2
N ~	2nih
	 1nhh
Q
s 6=h

	iss
1=2 
R10 p(N+1)=2 1K02	nhh1=2 p=2Qs 6=hK12	iss1=2 p=2 dp, (41)
with ~	nih = 	ih

ri w

i p
1  
i dni
 
, 	nh =
P
s
~	nsh as dened earlier, and the cdf of prices given
by (22):
F pn(p) = 1 
Q
s 2

	nss
1=2
p=2K1

2

	nss
1=2
p=2

. (42)
7.1 Trade, international production, and welfare
This section will investigate the welfare e¤ects of international trade and production in manufac-
tures. It will start by quantifying the welfare e¤ects of the current levels of trade and international
production. It will then investigate a counterfactual world in which there are no barriers to trade
and international production is as easy as the domestic one.
7.1.1 Autarky
First, we will consider how much the current level of international trade in manufactures contributes
to welfare. For this purpose, a counterfactual experiment will simulate an increase in trade costs
dni (while holding all the other parameters constant at their baseline levels) to the point where
international trade disappears. Welfare will be measured by real income.
The results of the experiment, presented in the rst column of Table S1, show that the contri-
bution of the current level of international trade to the current level of welfare varies between 0.5%
in Japan and 4% in Canada. It is not surprising that the contribution of trade is the greatest in
Canada: it currently spends a half of its income on foreign goods and sends a half of its output
abroad. By comparison, Japan spends only 10% of its income on foreign goods and sends 20%
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of its output abroad. The numbers reported in the rst column of Table S1 are similar to those
presented in the fourth column of Table IX in Eaton and Kortum (2002).33
Next, we will consider how much the current level of international production in manufactures
contributes to welfare. For this purpose, we will perform a counterfactual experiment that will
simulate a decrease in implementation factors 	ih;i6=h (while holding all the other parameters,
including trade costs, constant at their baseline levels) to the point where international production
disappears.34
The results of this experiment are presented in the second column of Table S1. As with trade,
Japan has the distinction of having the smallest contribution of international production to welfare
at 0.05%, while Canada has the largest at 2.1%. It is not surprising that the contribution of IP is
the largest in Canada, since it has the greatest presence of foreign producers on its soil. As discussed
in Section 4, about 30% of Canadian labor force is employed by foreign producers (mostly from the
U.S.) that make a noticeable contribution to the average productivity in Canada.
The contribution of international production to welfare is smaller than the contribution of trade
by a factor of two for Canada, Europe, and the U.S., factor of six for the ROW, and factor of nine
for Japan. This result is not unexpected given that the current levels of international production
are fairly modest for most countries. For example, only 1.5% of Japanese workers are employed by
foreign producers.
Finally, we will consider how much the current levels of both trade and international production
in manufactures (jointly) contribute to welfare. For this purpose, a counterfactual experiment will
simulate a simultaneous increase in trade costs dni and decrease in implementation factors 	ih;i6=h
to the point where both international trade and production disappear.
The combined welfare e¤ects of international production and trade, i.e. the e¤ects of openness,
are presented in the third column of Table S1. The model predicts that Canada would see its welfare
reduced by about 7% if its manufacturing sector were to become closed to trade and international
production. Canada being a small fairly open economy, this result is not surprising. Europe, the
U.S., and ROW would see their welfare reduced by 1.7-2.5%, Japan by 0.6%.
The welfare e¤ect of both trade and international production is greater than the sum of the
welfare e¤ect of trade and the welfare e¤ect of international production (i.e. column three of Table
S1 is greater than the sum of columns one and two). This occurs because trade and IP are, to some
degree, substitutes. For example, when international trade is stopped, international production
increases. Similarly, when international production is stopped, international trade increases.
7.1.2 Open world
It is also interesting to quantify the potential benets to having free trade and international pro-
duction. Free trade exists when all international trade costs dni are equal to one, i.e. the same
as the domestic trade costs. Free international production exists when all mean implementation
factors 	1=ih are equal to one, i.e. the same as the domestic mean implementation factors. With
free IP, technology is freely mobile across countries.
This section will simulate several scenarios: (a) a world in which trade is free, but the imple-
mentation factors are same as in the todays world, (b) a world in which international production
33Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) show that these gains from trade can be obtained from a large
class of trade models.
34Trade costs are held at their base values, presented in Table B4.
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is free, but the trade costs are the same as in the todays world, and (c) a fully open world in which
both trade and international production are free.
The last three columns of Table S1 show the welfare changes that are predicted by these sim-
ulations. We note that the potential gains from free trade and international production are much
greater than the welfare gains from the current levels of trade and international production.35 All
countries are predicted to reap substantial rewards from more openness.
Gains from free trade depend on country size and current trade magnitude. Canada, as a small
country, has the most to gain from free trade. Japan, as the currently least-open country, also
stands to gain substantially. The size of gains from free international production are related to
the current level of domestic technology. The ROW, having domestic technology that is much less
productive than the other countries, stands to gain by far the most. Free international production
gives it a very large 90% increase in welfare. This shows that technology di¤usion can be a source
of signicant economic growth. This is especially true for less developed countries, such as the
ROW, that have low productivities of domestically-sources technologies.
Comparing the gains from free trade and international production, we can see that for the U.S.,
the gains are similar. For countries with productive domestic technologies, such as Japan, free trade
is more benecial than fully integrated international production. For countries with less productive
domestic technologies, such as Europe and especially the ROW, free international production is
more benecial. Being a small country, Canada benets greatly from free trade. However, having
relatively less productive domestic technologies, it also benets signicantly from free international
production.
The last column of Table S1 shows the predicted benets of a completely open world, with free
trade and international production. The numbers are quite large. The U.S. is predicted to see a
26% increase in its real income, Japan and Europe - 40-45% increase. Canada and the ROW are
predicted to benet the most: Canada stands to gain 110% while the ROW 118%. To put these
numbers in perspective, consider that a 26% increase in real income can also be obtained from 8
years of a 3% annual economic growth. A 40-45% increase in real income can be obtained from
11.5-12.5 years of a 3% annual economic growth and a 110% increase - from 25 years.
Similarly to the case of autarky simulations of the previous section, the welfare e¤ect of both
free trade and international production is greater than the sum of the welfare e¤ect of free trade
and the welfare e¤ect of free international production. As in those simulations, this occurs because
trade and IP are, to some extent, substitutes. For example, when international trade becomes free,
international production decreases. Therefore, the liberalization of international production has
a greater e¤ect on the size of international production when trade is free than when it is costly.
Similarly, when international production becomes free, international trade drops. Therefore, trade
liberalization has a greater e¤ect on the size of trade when international production is free than
when it is costly.
Table S2 shows what happens to the activity of foreign a¢ liates when international production
becomes free (i.e. fully internationally integrated).36 The ownership structure of producers becomes
the same in all countries. Producers from more productive countries get a bigger slice of production,
those from less productive countries get a smaller slice. Japanese producers become responsible for
38% of total employment, the U.S. producers for 30%. On the other hand, Canadian producers get
8% of labor in each country and the ROW producers get 2%. Still, even 8% represents big gains
35Eaton and Kortum (2002) reach the same conclusion for international trade.
36Regardless of whether the international trade is free or not.
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for Canadian producers, as can be seen by comparing Tables S2 and D6.
Since with free international production the ownership structure is the same in all countries, the
production productivities are also the same everywhere. This can be veried by using the Eaton-
Kortum model to infer the technology parameters Ti in the world with free international production.
The parameters are inferred using the procedure described in Section 6 and the simulated data on
output, spending, wages, and rates of return for the world with free international production. As
expected, the estimated technology parameters Ti are exactly the same in all countries. Therefore,
the world with free international production is the world where technology has di¤used completely
throughout the world.
7.2 Free trade agreements and o¤shoring
It is often suggested that implementing a free-trade agreement between a developed and developing
country would result in more o¤shoring by the developed countrys rms. Given cheap labor in
the developing country and cheap costs of bringing the goods back to the developed country, rms
would have an incentive to move their production to the developing country.
This section looks for the maximum size of this e¤ect by forecasting the consequences of re-
moving all trade costs between the U.S. and ROW. This is accomplished by solving the model with
dUS;ROW and dROW;US set to one. Of course free-trade agreements do not result in free trade. They
only remove the policy-related trade barriers. However, since the current levels of the policy-related
trade barriers between the U.S. and ROW are not known, I will estimate the upper bound of the
e¤ects of a free-trade agreement by simulating completely free trade.
The model predicts all the usual consequences of a free trade agreement: higher volume of
trade, greater welfare in both countries. However, we are specically interested in what happens
to o¤shoring by the U.S. producers. There are several ways to measure the volume of o¤shoring.
One is to look at US;ROW;US which is the fraction of the U.S. spending that goes towards goods
made by the U.S. rms in the ROW. This number increases from 0.07% to 0.56%. Another way
to measure o¤shoring is to look at the value of goods sold in the U.S. by the ROW-located U.S.
producers relative to the total output in the ROW. This number increases from 0.06% to 0.5% as
the consequence of the free-trade agreement.
Both measures show signicant, 8-fold increases. However, 0.56% or 0.5% are still small num-
bers. The main obstacles to the U.S. producers trying to establish production in the ROW are the
low implementation factors they encounter there. Consider for example the world with free trade
and fully integrated international production that was simulated in the previous section. In that
world, fully 15.2% of the U.S. spending goes towards goods made in the ROW by the U.S. rms.37
8 Conclusion
The paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. Producers
develop technology at the headquarters in their home countries and can implement this technology
in any country around the world. When searching for the location of production, producers consider
the costs of production and the proximity to goods markets. Important features of the model include
37Another way to measure o¤shoring is to look at the value of goods sold in the U.S. by ROW-located U.S.
producers. This value grows more than 10-fold as the result of the free-trade agreement because not only the fraction
of these goods in total U.S. spending increases, but the total U.S. spending increases as well.
24
technological di¤erences across producers, technology transfer through international production,
and the presence of trade costs. Technology transfer means that the technology used in production
in each country is endogenous. The model produces two gravity-like equations: one for international
trade and the other for international investment.
The model is parametrized using data for ve countries. Model parameters describe the states
of technology in di¤erent countries, barriers to international investment, and trade costs. The
estimated states of technology are compared and contrasted with the states of technology of the
Eaton-Kortum model.
The model is used to quantify the welfare e¤ects of the current level of international production
and trade. The current level of international production contributes between 0.05 and 2.1% to
the current level of welfare, depending on the country, while the current level of trade contributes
between 0.5 and 4%. The model is also used to quantify the welfare e¤ects of moving to a world
with trade free trade and free international production. Free trade is estimated to increase welfare
by 9-36% while free international production by 8-90%.
The model is used to study the e¤ects of a free-trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW on
o¤shoring. The model predicts that such a free-trade agreement will cause o¤shoring to increase
signicantly in percentage terms while remaining small in absolute terms. Welfare is predicted to
increase in both countries.
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Data source: BEA
Data source: BEA
Figure D1  Local sales as a percentage of the total sales of the U.S. MOFAs, 1999
Figure D2  U.S. exports to a country as a fraction of the local sales of the U.S. MOFAs located there
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units Canada Europe Japan US ROW
Manuf. imports Bil. USD  193  782  220  895  1,308
Manuf. exports Bil. USD  194  885  424  651  1,243
Manuf. output Bil. USD  366  3,511  2,300  3,466  4,421
Spending on
manufactures(1) Bil. USD  365  3,408  2,096  3,709  4,485
Total GDP Bil. USD  738  6,774  4,676  9,839  8,938
Compensation 
per worker USD 34,367 33,234 39,236 48,201 4,861
(1)Spending is calculated as output plus imports minus exports
Canada Europe Japan US ROW
Canada  172  15  8  140  29
Europe  9  2,626  52  105  617
Japan  4  30  1,876  52  133
U.S.  164  146  122  2,815  464
ROW  17  694  242  354  3,178
Note: importing countries are in rows while exporting countries are in columns.
         Table entries show how much the importing country spends on goods from each of
          the exporting countries. Spending on domestic goods is shown on the diagonal.
Canada Europe Japan US ROW
Canada 0.471 0.041 0.022 0.384 0.081
Europe 0.003 0.771 0.015 0.031 0.181
Japan 0.002 0.014 0.895 0.025 0.064
U.S. 0.044 0.039 0.033 0.759 0.125
ROW 0.004 0.155 0.054 0.079 0.708
Note: importing countries are in rows while exporting countries are in columns.
         Table entries show how much the importing country spends on goods from each of
          the exporting countries as a fraction of its total spending. Spending on domestic goods
          is shown on the diagonal. By design, each row adds up to one.
Canada Europe Japan US ROW
Canada 0.470 0.004 0.004 0.040 0.007
Europe 0.024 0.748 0.023 0.030 0.140
Japan 0.012 0.009 0.815 0.015 0.030
U.S. 0.447 0.042 0.053 0.812 0.105
ROW 0.047 0.198 0.105 0.102 0.719
Note: importing countries are in rows while exporting countries are in columns.
         Table entries show how much the exporting country sends to each of the importing
          countries as a fraction of its total output. Revenue from domestic sales is shown
          on the diagonal. By design, each column adds up to one.
Table D4  Trade (as a fraction of exporter's output)
Table D1  Country data
Table D2  Trade (billions USD)
Table D3  Trade (as a fraction of importer's spending)
Canada Europe Japan US ROW
Canada 1,412 122 18 414 21
Europe 72 19,547 127 1,216 884
Japan 2 44 8,806 69 19
U.S. 167 946 355 13,643 533
ROW 192 3,694 1,501 2,451 113,549
Note: host countries are in rows while owner countries are in columns.
Canada Europe Japan US ROW
Canada 0.711 0.062 0.009 0.208 0.011
Europe 0.003 0.895 0.006 0.056 0.040
Japan 0.000 0.005 0.985 0.008 0.002
U.S. 0.011 0.060 0.023 0.872 0.034
ROW 0.002 0.030 0.012 0.020 0.935
Note: host countries are in rows while owner countries are in columns.
         By design, each row adds up to one.
Canada Europe Japan US ROW
Canada 0.765 0.005 0.002 0.023 0.000
Europe 0.039 0.803 0.012 0.068 0.008
Japan 0.001 0.002 0.815 0.004 0.000
U.S. 0.091 0.039 0.033 0.767 0.005
ROW 0.104 0.152 0.139 0.138 0.987
Note: host countries are in rows while owner countries are in columns.
         By design, each column adds up to one.
(as a fraction of total employment by each country's firms)
Table D6  Employment by location and ownership
(as a fraction of total employment in each country)
Table D7  Employment by location and ownership
Table D5  Employment by location and ownership
Value
Canada 0.80
Europe 0.95
Japan 1.05
U.S. 1
ROW 0.65
Canada Europe Japan U.S. ROW
Canada 1 0.62 0.43 0.74 0.73
Europe 0.49 1 0.42 0.61 0.95
Japan 0.37 0.49 1 0.49 0.67
U.S. 0.64 0.69 0.54 1 0.96
ROW 0.31 0.42 0.32 0.37 1
Note: host countries are in rows, owner countries are in columns
Canada Europe Japan U.S. ROW
Canada 0.80 0.58 0.44 0.74 0.47
Europe 0.39 0.95 0.44 0.61 0.62
Japan 0.30 0.46 1.05 0.49 0.43
U.S. 0.51 0.66 0.57 1.00 0.62
ROW 0.24 0.40 0.34 0.37 0.65
Note: host countries are in rows, owner countries are in columns
Canada Europe Japan U.S. ROW
Canada 1 1.75 2.22 1.17 1.57
Europe 1.96 1 2.14 1.57 1.24
Japan 1.91 1.77 1 1.54 1.38
U.S. 1.35 1.68 1.99 1 1.39
ROW 1.89 1.33 1.79 1.40 1
Note: importer countries are in rows, exporter countries are in columns
Canada Europe Japan U.S. ROW
Labor force, L i,  mil. 2.08 20.60 11.43 14.02 177.34
Capital stock, K i,  tril. USD 0.19 1.84 1.21 1.82 2.32
0.15 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.16
Share of manufacturing in 
country spending, φi
Table B1  Mean blueprint productivities, (Λ h /Λ US )1/θ
Table B5  Calculated macroeconomic variables
Table B2  Mean implementation factors, (Ψ ih ) 1/θ
Table B4  Trade costs (d ni )
and mean implementation factors, (ΨihΛ h /Λ US )1/θ
Table B3  Production productivities of producers that draw mean productivities
Note: the correlation is -0.58 and the slope is close to -1. The correlation 
         becomes -0.77 if the country pairs involving ROW are excluded.
Canada Europe Japan U.S. ROW
Canada 1 0.92 0.89 1.03 0.64
Europe 1.09 1 0.97 1.12 0.70
Japan 1.12 1.03 1 1.15 0.72
U.S. 0.98 0.90 0.87 1 0.62
ROW 1.56 1.44 1.39 1.60 1
Note: host countries (i ) are in rows, owner countries (h ) are in columns
Canada Europe Japan U.S. ROW
Canada 1 0.99 0.84 0.89 0.74
Europe 1.05 1 0.88 1.07 0.82
Japan 0.79 0.89 1 0.88 0.66
U.S. 0.84 1.04 0.93 1 0.84
ROW 0.90 0.80 0.81 0.83 1
Note: host/importing countries are in rows, owner/exporting countries are in columns
Canada Europe Japan U.S. ROW
Canada 1 0.29 0.20 0.56 0.25
Europe 0.31 1 0.23 0.41 0.50
Japan 0.19 0.23 1 0.29 0.27
U.S. 0.53 0.40 0.30 1 0.43
ROW 0.30 0.49 0.33 0.43 1
Note: offshore hosting countries are in rows, owner (home) countries are in columns
Table B7  Expected price from exporting relative to international production
Table B8  Expected price from domestic production relative to offshoring
Figure B1  Trade costs vs. mean implementation factors
Table B6  Relative costs of production, c h /c i
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Table B9  Mean productivities inferred using the Eaton-Kortum model, (T h /T US )1/θ
Value
Canada 0.88
Europe 0.95
Japan 1.04
U.S. 1
ROW 0.65
No trade No IP Complete Free trade Free IP Both
Canada -4.03% -2.09% -7.14% 35.63% 22.94% 109.50%
Europe -1.50% -0.66% -2.48% 12.85% 17.61% 45.18%
Japan -0.51% -0.05% -0.62% 17.69% 8.93% 40.48%
U.S. -1.05% -0.55% -1.73% 9.14% 7.98% 26.23%
ROW -1.94% -0.34% -2.53% 9.89% 89.98% 118.11%
Canada Europe Japan US ROW
Canada 0.08 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.02
Europe 0.08 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.02
Japan 0.08 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.02
U.S. 0.08 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.02
ROW 0.08 0.22 0.38 0.30 0.02
Note: host countries are in rows, owner countries are in columns.
         By design, each row adds up to one.
Figure B2  Local sales as a precentage of the total sales of the U.S. affiliates
(as a fraction of total employment in each country)
Table S1  Welfare effects
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Table S2  Employment by location and ownership with free IP
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